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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-RACIAL DISCRIMINATION---SCHOOLS AND
SCHOOL DISTRICTS-DESEGREGATION-THE

To

DUTY OF THE STATE Is

ACT AT ONCE To ELIMINATE By POSITIVE MEANS ALL VESTIGES

OF THE DUAL SCHOOL STRUCTURE AND To COMPENSATE FOR THE
ABIDING SCARS

OF PAST DISCRIMINATION.

United States v. Texas,

447 F.2d 441(5th Cir. 1971).
Defendants' were charged with violation of Title VI of the Civil
Rights Act of 19642 and the fourteenth amendment to the United States
Constitution. The allegations pertained to the creation and continued
maintenance of nine all-black school districts, which denied the students
equal educational opportunities.
The trial court found that the policies and practices of the Texas
Education Agency were responsible for or contributed to the operation
of the all-black districts." The defendant county boards of education
denied, avoided and failed to consider or order the consolidation of
these all-black districts into adjacent units in their jurisdiction. The
district court held that school districts which are created and maintained to perpetuate a dual school system were unconstitutional and
required consolidation with nearby units to assure their students equal
educational opportunities. 4 The defendants were charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps necessary to convert to a unitary
system. The district court ordered the Texas Education Agency to reevaluate and scrutinize its policies and practices and submit a plan
developed in light of the analysis. 5 Defendants filed their plan and
plaintiff responded with objections and recommendations. The district
court considered these objections and recommendations upon rehearing8
to determine whether the defendant agency's plan would meet its affirmative duty to eliminate racial discrimination. Both decisions of the
district court were appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit. Held-Affirmed in part, modified, and remanded
1 The defendants included the Texas Education Agency, the independent school districts, the county boards of education, and the county superintendents.
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000c et seq.
3 United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970). The State of Texas through
the Texas Education Agency failed to adequately oversee and supervise the districts. The
defendants also arranged for, approved, or acquiesced in various detachments and annexations of territory, student transfers and transportation arrangements which had the effect
of creating and perpetuating the all-black districts.
4 United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970) (hereinafter referred to as
Texas I).
5 Id. The primary responsibility for the plan was allocated to the Texas Education
Agency. In the plan, the defendants were to consider and include the nondiscriminatory
assignment of students, the creation of bi-racial committees and the nondiscriminatory
treatment of faculty and staff in the newly consolidated districts.
6 United States v. Texas, 330 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Tex. 1971) (hereinafter referred to as
Texas II).

Published by Digital Commons at St. Mary's University, 2022

1

St. Mary's Law Journal, Vol. 3 [2022], No. 2, Art. 18

ST. MARY'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 3

with directions.7 The duty of the state is to act at once to eliminate
by positive means all vestiges of the dual school structure and to compensate for the abiding scars of past discrimination. The defendants
shall not permit, make arrangements for, approve, acquiesce in or give
support of any kind to activities that will have the effect of reducing
or impeding desegregation or resulting in the discriminatory treatment
of students on the ground of race, color, or national origin; such activities consisting of student transfers, changes in school boundaries, bus
routes or runs, extra-curricular activities, assignment of students, or the
treatment of personnel who work directly with children in a discriminatory manner on account of race. A defendant district found not to be
operating in compliance with the order will have its percentage of state
funds reduced and/or its accreditation jeopardized and subject to suspension.
Prior to the decision in Brown v. Board of Education,8 the State of
Texas operated separate schools for white and black children pursuant
to the state constitution9 and statutes. 10 This resulted in a dual school
system, and eventually led to the establishment of school district lines
enclosing single schools that served small communities, usually consisting of only one race. The isolation of these racially homogeneous
communities entrenched segregation. To eliminate this segregation, the
Supreme Court in Brown I ruled that the "separate but equal" doctrine" had no place in the field of education, and that the "plaintiffs
• . .are, by reason of the segregation complained of, deprived of the

equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.' 1 2 One year later, Brown v. Board of Education's was decided on
7 United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1971) (hereinafter referred to as Texas
III), affirmed Texas I and affirmed in part, modified, and remanded with directions Texas
IH.
8 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954) (hereinafter referred to as Brown 1).
9 Tax. CONsr. art. VII, § 7, provided that separate schools were to be provided for white
and colored children, with impartial provisions to be made for both. See also TEx. CONST.
art. VII, § 7 comment, for an interesting historical background of the education of Negroes
in Texas.
10 Tex. Laws 1905, ch. 124, § 96 at 289. "[N]o white children shall attend schools supported for colored children, nor shall colored children attend schools supported for white
children. The terms 'colored race' and 'colored children,' as used .. . include all persons
of mixed blood descended from Negro ancestry." (Quoted materials are from the latest
codification of the earlier statute found at TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 2900 (1914),
repealed by Acts 1969, 61st Leg., p. 361, ch. 129, § 1,eff. Sept. 1, 1969; Acts 1969, 61st Leg.,
p. 3024, ch. 889, § 2, eff. Sept. 1, 1969).
11 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 488, 74 S. Ct. 686, 688, 98 L. Ed. 873, 877
(1954). The "separate but equal" doctrine as announced in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 Us.
537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896), declared that equality of treatment was achieved
when substantially equal facilities were provided even though these facilities were separate.
12 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 495, 74 S.Ct. 686, 692, 98 L. Ed. 873, 881
(1954). The question presented in Brown I was whether segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible"
factors were equal, deprived these children of equal educational opportunities. The decision did not turn on a comparison of the tangible factors involved, but upon the effect of
segregation itself on public education. Id. at 492, 74 S. Ct. at 690, 98 L. Ed. at 879. Thus
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the question of relief. Brown II recognized that different local conditions and problems would prevent the court from formulating any
detailed decrees, or setting specific guidelines for desegregation, thus
requiring the defendants to "make a prompt and reasonable start" toward compliance with Brown 1.14 In cases decided since Brown II, the
Supreme Court and various federal appellate courts have been faced
with the task of deciding whether different desegregation plans adequately complied with the established mandates.1 5 In Green v. County
School Board'6 the Court placed the burden on the school board to
propose a plan that "promises realistically to work, and promises realistically to work now,"' 7 eliminating the "prompt and reasonable start"
language of Brown I. The Supreme Court in Alexander v. Board of
Education,'8 held that the standard of "all deliberate speed" as espoused
the Court held that "[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal," and deny
to Negro children the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 495, 74 S. Ct. at 692, 98 L. Ed. at 881.
1 Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753, 99 L. Ed. 1083 (1955)
(hereinafter referred to as Brown 11).
14 Id. In remanding the cases to the district courts, the Supreme Court said:
Full implementation of these constitutional principles may require solution of varied
local school problems. School authorities have the primary responsibility for elucidating, assessing, and solving these problems; courts will have to consider whether the
action of school authorities constitutes good faith implementation of the governing
constitutional principles. Because of their proximity to local conditions and the
possible need for further hearings, the' courts which originally heard these cases can
best perform this judicial appraisal.
Id. at 299, 75 S. Ct. at 756, 99 L. Ed. at 1105.
The only requirement placed on the defendants in Brown II was to "make a prompt
and reasonable start toward full compliance," (Id. at 300, 75 S. Ct. at 756, 99 L. Ed. at
1106), with Brown I and that the defendants should proceed with "all deliberate speed."
Id. at 301, 75 S. Ct. at 757, 99 L. Ed. at 1106.
15 See Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School Board, 396 U.S. 290, 90 S. Ct. 608, 24 L.
Ed.2d 477 (1970); United States v. Montgomery County Board of Education, 395 U.S. 225,
89 S. Ct. 1670, 23 L. Ed.2d 263 (1969); Monroe v. Board of Commissioners, 391 U.S. 450, 88
S. Ct. 1700, 20 L. Ed.2d 733 (1968); Raney v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 443, 88 S.Ct.
1697, 20 L. Ed.2d 727 (1968); Griffin v. School Board, 377 U.S. 218, 84 S. Ct. 1226, 12 L.
Ed.2d 256 (1964); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 78 S. Ct. 1401, 3 L. Ed.2d 5 (1958). See, e.g.,
Andrews v. City of Monroe, 425 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1970) (to achieve a unitary system,
existing transportation facilities should be reorganized); United States v. Board of Trustees, 424 F.2d 625 (5th Cir. 1970); Taylor v. Ouachita Parish School Board, 424 F.2d 324
(5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Hinds County School Board, 402 F.2d 926 (5th Cir. 1968);
Acree v. County Board of Education, 399 F.2d 151 (5th Cir. 1968); Adams v. Mathews, 403
F.2d 181 (5th Cir. 1968) (consolidation of 47 actions for purposes of appeal); United States
v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 840, 88 S. Ct. 77, 19 L. Ed.2d 104, modifying decree on rehearing en banc 380 F.2d
385 (5th Cir. 1967); Price v. Denison Board of Education, 348 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1965);
Christian v. Board of Education, 440 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1971).
16 391 U.S. 430, 88 S.Ct. 1689, 20 L. Ed.2d 716 (1968).
17 Id. at 439, 88 S.Ct. at 1694, 20 L. Ed.2d at 724. (Court's emphasis.) While imposing
this burden on the school boards, the Court said:
There is no universal answer to complex problems of desegregation; there is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every case. The matter must be assessed
in light of the circumstances present and the options available in each instance. It is
incumbent upon the school board to establish that its proposed plan promises meaningful and immediate progress ....
Id. at 439, 88 S.Ct. at 1695, 20 L. Ed.2d at 724.
18 396 U.S. 19, 90 S. Ct. 29, 24 L. Ed.2d 19 (1969). See also Carter v. West Feliciana
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in Brown II was no longer constitutionally permissible and directed the
school districts to "begin immediately to operate as unitary school
."19 Finally, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
systems ..
Education,20 the Court specifically endorsed the use of definite means
and plans including (1) busing, (2) consolidation, (3) student transfers,
(4) racially based mathematical ratios and (5) establishing faculty ratios
based on race to eliminate the dual school system.
The Supreme Court's language has evolved from directing a "prompt
and reasonable start," to requiring plans "that promise . . . to work
now," to "begin immediately," and finally, to a specific endorsement
of definite means which the Court feels will guide the defendants in
complying with their "affirmative duty" as announced in Green,21 and
fulfill the mandates long ago established in Brown I.
The decision in Texas I was founded upon those mandates established in Brown I and Green.22 In fashioning the relief to be granted,
the court relied upon the decisions announced in Brown II, Lee v.
Macon County Board of Education,23 and numerous other cases. 24 This

School Board, 396 U.S. 290, 292, 90 S. Ct. 608, 609, 24 L. Ed.2d 477, 480 (1970), where the
Court held that "g]raduated implementation of the relief (in school desegregation cases]
is no longer constitutionally permissible."
19 Alexander v. Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19, 20, 90 S. Ct. 29, 30, 24 L. Ed.2d 19, 21
(1969). (Emphasis added.)
20 402 U.S. 1, 91 S. Ct. 1267, 28 L. Ed.2d 554 (1971). The decision in Texas 11 was
announced April 20, 1971, the same day Swann was decided by the Supreme Court. The
Swann decision probably weighed heavily in guiding the Fifth Circuit's holdings announced
in the instant case.
In Alexander v. Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19, 21, 90 S. Ct. 29, 30, 24 L. Ed.2d 19, 21
(1969), the Supreme Court allowed the court of appeals the use of its discretion to "accept
all or any part of the ... recommendations of the Department of Health, Education, and
insofar as those recommendations insure a totally unitary school system .... "
Welfare ....
but the decision in Swann was the first specific endorsement by that Court of the stated
recommendations.
21 Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 437, 88 S. Ct. 1689, 1694, 20 L. Ed.2d 716,
723 (1968). "School boards . . . [are] charged with the affirmative duty to take whatever
steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination
would be eliminated root and branch."
22 United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043 (E.D. Tex. 1970) (Texas 1):
When evidence shows that these constitutionally guaranteed rights are being denied
or abridged under color of state law and that children are being denied equal educa.
tional opportunities with the approval, acquiescence or direct support of a state
agency, it is the affirmative duty of that state to take "whatever step might be necessary to . .. eliminate] racial discrimination . . . root and branch."
Id. at 1057, citing Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 88 S. Ct. 1689, 20 L. Ed.2d
716 (1968).
In viewing the districts in question as isolated racially homogenous residential areas
around which district lines were drawn, the Court said, "The same factors which were
found to exist in Brown v. Board of Education (citations omitted), and which led the
Supreme Court to hold that separate education was 'inherently unequal,' exhibit themselves
in the 'separate' districts, and, similarly, have rendered these segregated districts 'inherently
unequal.'" Id. at 1051.
23 Lee v. Macon County Board of Education, 267 F. Supp. 458 (M.D. Ala. 1967) (3-judge

court), affd sub nom., Wallace v. United States, 389 U.S. 215, 88 S. Ct. 415, 19 L. Ed.2d
422 (1967).
This Court can conceive of no other effective way to give the plaintiffs the relief
to which they are entitled under the evidence in this case than to enter a uniform
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relief was divided into two parts, the first ordering the elimination of
the nine all-black school districts through consolidation, and the second
requiring the Texas Education Agency to re-evaluate its policies and
prepare plans for desegregation to be implemented on a statewide basis.
On rehearing to determine the validity of the plan, 25 the court imposed upon the defendants certain duties and guidelines to be followed.
One of the duties prohibits student transfers, if such transfers impede
desegregation, thus limiting the use of a "freedom of choice" plan as
announced in Green.26 Another responsibility of the defendants is student assignments. Student assignments are permissible if they are necessary to "comply with constitutional standards, ' '27 such as the elimination
of "racially or ethnically identifiable schools." 28 Each year the Texas
Education Agency is to file a report with the district court showing
whether or not the student assignment plans "have resulted in compliance .... ,,29 One of the means endorsed to achieve proper student
assignment is busing.
Bus routes and runs as well as the assignment of students to buses
will be designed to insure the transportation of all eligible pupils
on a non-segregated and otherwise nondiscriminatory basis.3 0
The transportation systems are to be completely re-examined each year
and those routes found to serve 66 per cent or more students of a minority group should be investigated to determine whether they may be terminated, re-routed or combined with non-minority student routes.
However, this is not to be construed as requiring any fixed percentage
of a minority group on a particular route or run.3 ' Another permissible tool to effect desegregation is the changing of school district boundaries. Changes in the school district boundaries whether by detachment,
state-wide plan for school desegregation, made applicable to each local county and city
system not already under court order to desegregate, and to require these defendants
to implement it. (Emphasis added.)
24 See, e.g., Haney v. Board of Education, 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969). "Separate neighboring or overlapping school districts one black and the other white, are unconstitutional
when created and maintained to perpetuate a dual school system and such districts require
consolidation with nearby units so as to assure their students equal educational opportunities," United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043, 1050 (E.D. Tex. 1970), citing Haney v.
Board of Education, 410 F.2d 920 (8th Cir. 1969). See also United States v. Tatum, 306 F.
Supp. 285 (E.D. Tex. 1969) interpreting the school districts' obligations under Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964; Whittenburg v. Greenville School District, 298 F. Supp. 784
(D.S.C. 1969).
25 United States v. Texas, 330 F. Supp. 235 (E.D. Tex. 1971) (Texas II).
26 Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 440, 88 S. Ct. 1689, 1695, 20 L Ed.2d
716, 725 (1968). "[I]n desegregating a dual system a plan utilizing 'freedom of choice' is not
an end in itself."
27 United States v. Texas, 447 F.2d 441, 442 (5th Cir. 1971) (Texas III).
28 Id. at 447.
29 Id. at 447.
80 Id. at 445.
Sl Id. at 441.
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annexation, or consolidation are acceptable if they are not designed
to create a dual school system. The court stated:
[S]chool districts whose enrollment of minority race children is
greater than 66 per cent and whose total student population is fewer
than 250 students... [should] be annexed to or consolidated with
one or more independent school districts of over 150 students, or
one or more common school districts of over 400 students, so as to
eliminate its32 existence as a racially or ethnically separate educational unit.
The decision is not limited to student transfers, assignments, busing,
and consolidation, but includes alterations of the curriculum, 3 3 extracurricular activities 34 and personnel policies. 5 In each instance, the
defendants are required to "[c]hange or modify present administrative
practices or policies, so as to enforce federal constitutional and statutory
standards throughout the... school system of the state of Texas; ....,,36
The objective of desegregation cases from Brown I to the present has
been the elimination of the dual school system. The means by which
this objective was to be attained was, at first, a duty left entirely to
the school districts; but the courts have in each successive case defined
more precisely the scope of the defendant's duty and finally announced
specific remedial techniques. The "affirmative duty" has moved from
the school districts to the courts.37 While not laying down any "rigid
rules" the Swann decision and Texas III strongly suggest the use of
certain "permissible
tools" and at times have required the use of
8
these tools.1
Id. at 447.
Id. at 448. In order to achieve a comprehensive balanced curriculum, the defendants
are to institute a study of the educational needs of minority children, as well as provide
means "for students to transfer to different schools ... on a part-time basis to avail themselves of subjects not offered in their assigned school."
34 Id.
at 445. The defendants shall not support extra-curricular activities that are
operated on a discriminatory basis, and ". . . a suspension or reduction of programs and
activities to avoid operating them on a desegregated basis constitutes a violation of Title
VI and the Fourteenth Amendment."
35 Id. at 446. Any educational agency applying for state funds is "...to include with its
preliminary application for such funds a list of objective, non-racial and non-ethnic criteria
by which the . . . district will measure its faculty and staff for assignment, promotion,
demotion, reassignment or dismissal and by which it will judge prospective employees for
faculty and staff positions."
36 United States v. Texas, 321 F. Supp. 1043, 1060 (E.D. Tex. 1970) (Texas 1).
37 In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, -, 91 S.Ct. 1267,
1276, 28 L. Ed.2d 554, 566 (1971), the Court held, "If school authorities fail in their
affirmative obligations . . . . judicial authority may be invoked, [but] [r]emedial judicial
authority does not put judges automatically in the shoes of school authorities whose
powers are plenary. Judicial authority enters only when local authority defaults."
38 The court has retained "jurisdiction of this matter . . . 'for the purpose of entering
any and all further orders . .. to enforce or modify this decree." United States v. Texas,
447 F.2d 441, 449 (5th Cir. 1971) (Texas III). Since the decision in Texas III, the district
court issued an order August 26, 1971, under this same action, which requires the consolidation of the Del Rio and San Felipe Independent School Districts and the preparation
of a comprehensive plan for the desegregation and operation of the consolidated district.
32

33
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